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Stephen Barr is an elementary particle physicist familiar
with cosmology, who argues God’s existence from two
different sources of scientific evidence. He argues first from
cosmology, then from the purported immateriality of the
human mind. This book should interest this journal’s
readers because 1. Barr’s cosmological argument, although
no ‘clincher,’ is perfectly reasonable. One can therefore
assess the appropriateness of arguing God from design in a
context that has not been poisoned by a willful, unreason-
able hostility to Darwin’s concept of evolution by natural
selection, whereas 2. Barr’s argument for God from the
immateriality of mind is shaped by teachings of the Roman
Catholic magisterium developed in defiance of, and inten-
ded to override, scientific enquiry. Barr’s argument illus-
trates how these teachings, which exaggerate the (obvious)
contrasts between human beings and other animals by
denying minds to the latter, have detrimental consequences
for scientific understanding, medical research and Christian
behavior.
First, let us consider Barr’s cosmological argument. I am
a Christian imbued with Karl Barth’s suspicion of ‘natural
theology’ (the inference from nature of God’s existence and
attributes). I welcome arguments showing that belief in
God is reasonable, a view many atheist voices deny, but I
think the search for ‘clinching’ arguments for God that
‘disprove’ atheism do Christianity no service. God is said to
want our love. Genuine love is a free choice (Bernanos
1953, pp. 273–274: see Leigh 2013), not the fruit of coerciveCorrespondence: bufotyphonius@gmail.com
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in any medium, provided the original work is pproofs. I feel that Pascal’s (1976) Pensée #248 (my transla-
tion) was far closer to the truth in saying ‘Faith is different
from proof: the one is human, the other is a gift of God.
“The just shall live by faith”: that is the faith that God
himself plants in one’s heart. Proof is often his means of
doing so, “faith comes by hearing,” but this faith is in one’s
heart, and makes one say not “I know” but “I believe.”’
Barr observes that our universe began from a ‘big bang,’
and that some atheists took long to accept this fact. In
accord with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, he
argues that order must come from greater order, and asks
where this order came from, as if thinking of the Prime
Mover of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa
Contra Gentiles, Book I, chapter 13, article 3). He considers
the beauty of physical law and ‘the unreasonable effective-
ness of mathematics in the natural sciences’ (Wigner 1967)
signs that a God, who wanted us to understand this order,
created it. Sadly, Barr’s appreciation of the beauty of
physical law is not widely shared, because our age has failed
so dismally to spread an understanding of the mathematics
on which these laws are based. This failure has sharpened
our society’s divisions in various ways.
Next, Barr shows that for the universe to last long
enough, generate enough different chemical elements, and
grow large enough for some part of it to support the origin
and evolution of life, the laws and constants of nature must
be adjusted quite precisely. Indeed, Smolin (1992) thinks it
can be shown that slight random changes in the constants
of nature are overwhelmingly likely to diminish a universe’s
prospective lifetime and the number and size range of the
stars it produces, a circumstance that suggests that our
universe is organized to evolve life; cf Leigh and Vermeij,
2002. Barr’s argument from these data that God created a
universe where human beings would evolve is not coercive,n Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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would not be here to know it. Does his argument suffice to
show that belief in God does not demand a flight from
reason?
If valid, Barr’s cosmological argument buys him little.
One reason why Pascal (1976), Pensée #556, p. 206, refused
to try to prove the existence of God, the immortality of the
soul and the like by natural reason was that ‘this know-
ledge, without Jesus Christ, is useless and sterile.’ And
indeed, the philosophically inclined mathematical physicist
Hermann Weyl, who had an unmatched sense of the
beauty of mathematical law in physics (Weyl 1950, 1952),
defined God as the ‘completed infinite, who cannot pene-
trate into man by revelation, nor man penetrate to him by
mystical perception’ (Weyl 1932, p. 84). This is not the God
of Abraham who hears, and can answer, prayer.
Nevertheless, the cosmological argument from design
holds together far better than its biological counterpart. In
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals,
Darwin (1872, p. 12) wrote ‘as long as man and all other
animals are viewed as independent creations, an effectual
stop is put to our natural desire to investigate the causes of
Expression. By this doctrine [of special creation] anything
and everything could be equally well explained; and [this
doctrine] has proved as pernicious with respect to Ex-
pression as to any other branch of natural history.’ As
Dobzhansky famously said, ‘Nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of evolution,’ — indeed, of evolution by
natural selection. A cosmologist, however, might conclude
that his knowledge of the universe and its laws makes the
most sense if Someone created the universe who meant us
to understand it. True, the reversal from the biological ar-
gument from design is incomplete. Unlike natural selection,
God’s actions escape experimental analysis, justifying
St. Thomas’s (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 84,
Article 1) exclusion from natural science of phenomena
involving God’s direct intervention. The example of
Paley’s (1803) natural theology, moreover, reminds us
that new developments in science could overturn
cosmological arguments for God in the twinkling of an
eye. At the moment, however, the cosmological argument
from design lacks the devastating alternatives that make
its biological counterpart so implausible.
Many are now seeking alternatives for this cosmological
argument. They believe, with Monod (1970, p. 37) and
Smolin (1992, p. 774) that objective science cannot accept
any explanation based on final causes or ultimate purposes
as conveying genuine understanding. After all, discarding
final causes from physical science, and focusing on how
rather than why things happen, triggered the scientific
revolution. In biology, however, it is as important to know
why as how animals and plants do what they do and are
designed as they are (Dennett 1995). Before Darwin, many
saw this circumstance as proof that organisms weredesigned by God (Paley 1803): some still cling to this ‘proof.’
Nonetheless, when the assertion that the universe was de-
signed to allow life to evolve attracted adherents, physicists
sought mechanistic explanations of this circumstance to
preserve the integrity of their science. Accordingly, Smolin
(1992) devised an imaginative model of natural selection
among universes that would eventually produce universes
where life could evolve. Here, each gravitational collapse of
a universe, and each new black hole, spawns a new universe
with slightly different physical constants, and natural
selection favors universes with new and larger stars, more
of which eventually collapse into black holes — which
universes are, incidentally, more propitious for evolving life.
Dennett (1995) and Barr both review other ways used to
circumvent the argument from design, involving unheard-of
abundances of invisible universes that seem eminently ripe
for Occam’s razor. If the argument for God from cosmo-
logical design provokes such responses from its opponents,
will it provoke others to view belief in God as reasonable
enough to consider?
This book’s second half — its Part V, What is Man? —
argues that some aspects of the human mind cannot be
material. These aspects would be signs of God’s direct
action, and beyond the reach of science. He does not con-
sider his argument absolutely coercive, but what he lists as
its only alternatives are decidedly unappealing and implaus-
ible. Are these the only valid alternatives? Will his argument
suffice to force quondam materialists into the corral of belief
in God, in the intellectual equivalent of a cattle drive?
The materiality of minds, human or otherwise, however, is
a biological problem. Barr is a physicist who seems
unfamiliar with the relevant biological literature. He opens
Part V by contrasting the ‘materialist’ view of human beings
with the religious view promoted by the Roman Catholic
magisterium — drawing a contrast between materialist
monism and spiritualist dualism which the moral philos-
opher Paul Ricoeur finds abusively simplistic (Changeux and
Ricoeur 1998). My central problem with this approach is the
exaggeration of the contrast between human beings and
other animals by attributing consciousness and thought only
to human beings. In Barr’s view, when a material human
sperm fertilizes an equally material egg, God specially
creates a soul for it (p. 225). Barr thinks that: 1. in bodily
function, humans are animals, 2. there is a close connection
between physical events in the brain and mental phenom-
ena, and 3. the brain may be essential for any mental
function. Nonetheless, his belief in a human soul leads him
to insist that human intellect, free will and foresight (unlike
the mental capacities of any other animal) cannot ‘be
entirely reduced to the material’ (p. 173). We shall see how
this doctrinally imposed dichotomy between human beings
and other animals poisons his argument.
Barr then marshals his argument, in a series of deep
questions with no clear answers:
Leigh Evolution: Education and Outreach 2014, 7:8 Page 3 of 5
http://www.evolution-outreach.com/content/7/1/81. Do we have free will, the ability to make rational
choices? Could this be true of purely material beings?
2. Can purely material beings understand? Can they know
truth, factual or moral?
3. Does a human (or an animal) mind act like a computer?
One could respond to these questions as follows:
First, the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics may
shatter the determinism of Newton’s and Einstein’s laws of
physics (Barr, p. 179; Weyl 1949, p. 251). One could also
argue that chaos places the hypothesis of determinism
beyond the realm of testability. The ability of material
beings to make rational choices accordingly hinges on the
second question’s answer.
Second, Barr argues that only human minds, with im-
material elements, can think, understand, and distinguish
true from false. This argument fails because he distinguishes
human beings too radically from other animals, and perhaps
also because material beings can do things Barr says they
cannot. Other animals cannot match human minds, which
minds, indeed, have made human beings the de facto lords
of Creation. Human minds, however, evolved by combining
abilities already present in other animals as Konrad Lorenz
(1977) showed.
Barr argues, for example, that only immaterial intellects
can form abstract concepts. Nonetheless, many animals
unconsciously, mechanistically, abstract persistent objects
from a maze of sensory data derived from views of the
object from different distances and angles, under different
lighting (Lorenz 1977, pp. 117–120). Weyl (2009, p. 199)
observes that the means by which physicists infer the
presence of atoms or electrons are a natural prolongation
of the operations a person’s (or an animal’s) ‘mind
performs (although mainly unconsciously) in perception,
when, e.g., the solid shape of a body constitutes itself as
the common source of its various perspective views.’ The
power to abstract objects from sensory data also allows
animals to classify objects into categories, as do human
babies (Lorenz 1977, p. 117).
Barr also restricts rational choice to human intellects.
Rational choice requires thought and foresight. A tropical
forest fruit bat has enough foresight to search for trees
about to ripen fruit after eating its fill (Morrison 1978,
p. 719). How widespread thinking is among animals is
much disputed (Menzel and Fischer 2011), although it
seems clear that some non-human animals do think.
Darwin (1871, p. 48) recounts a friend’s story of how his
retriever solved a problem it had never previously encoun-
tered. This friend winged two ducks. The retriever, finding
itself unable to bring back both at once, killed one —
something it had never done before — as if to prevent its
escape, brought back the live duck, and returned to fetch
the other. This solution required an ability to foresee the
outcome of its actions. When faced with a problem,anthropoids, such as orangutans and chimpanzees, will
act as if they are thinking through possible solutions, only
acting after they have thought out an approach that suf-
fices to solve the problem — choosing rationally among
the alternatives they have thought of. Monkeys and rac-
coons, on the other hand, rush about, trying out each so-
lution as it occurs to them (Lorenz 1977, pp. 127–128).
Moreover, many animals know truly (Lorenz 1977) and
some can infer validly. From what a baboon sees and hears
of the interactions among the other 80 members of its
troop, it can infer the troop’s dominance hierarchy (who
takes precedence over whom) and matrilineal kinship
relationships (who is whose mother, sister, brother, grand-
mother, etc.). Failure to get the dominance hierarchy right
can earn the baboon a beating. Consistent failure to do so
may cost it its reproductive success: natural selection favors
a true grasp of the hierarchy. Moreover, some of these
skills are transferable. South African Boers formerly used
baboons as goatherds, partly because they had the ability to
associate kids with their correct mothers that no human
being could match (Cheney and Seyfarth 2007).
Barr also thinks that moral choices require immaterial
intellects. Many animals, however, live in groups whose
members can jointly accomplish what no member could do
alone — warding off competitors or predators, sharing
knowledge of where to find food, or taking down large prey.
Group life is mutually advantageous only if cheating can be
restrained sufficiently to preserve the benefits of cooper-
ation. Insofar as all a group’s members do, or will eventually,
contribute to its effectiveness, it behooves each member
not to endanger a fellow’s welfare (Leigh 2010), just as a
gang of thieves will only be effective if they treat each
other justly and sympathetically (Plato, Republic I, 352c;
Waley 1982, p. 74). Accordingly, relatively intelligent
social mammals such as dogs, wolves, monkeys and
chimpanzees show the rudiments of morality: they can
act from empathy, cooperate toward common goals, and
understand the rudiments of ‘fair play’ (Darwin 1871,
pp. 69–106; Bekoff and Pierce 2009). These propensities
are often most evident in young animals at play, which
hones both their motor and their social skills (Bekoff and
Pierce 2009). In non-human animals, such ‘moral obliga-
tion’ seldom extends beyond one’s own group: surely, that
circumstance is unconnected with materiality.
Third, Barr argues, quite correctly, that the human mind
cannot be viewed as a computer. A traditional computer is
a logical machine for drawing consequences from premises
by symbol manipulation (McGinn 1999, pp. 179–180). The
Viennese logician Kurt Gödel showed that one could
formulate statements in terms of a self-consistent set of
axioms which could not be proved from these axioms,
which nonetheless were true (Nagel and Newman 2001):
Barr, laudably, provides an outline of this proof. If these
axioms and rules for deduction functioned as our brain’s
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ment that we recognize as true, so our brain cannot be a
computer. Thinking beings, however, spend far more time
using their minds which make hypotheses about their
environs and test them empirically rather than deducing
them logically from premises (Changeux and Ricoeur 1998,
p. 56). Hofstader (2001, p. xvii) remarks that thinking
beings use guesswork, analogy, and trial and error far more
often than logical deduction. Must the minds that behave
thus be partly immaterial?
Proper answers to Barr’s question, however, hinge on
understanding consciousness. Yet, we are no nearer to un-
derstanding consciousness now (McGinn 1999) than when
Monod (1970, pp. 198–199) warned that we might have to
wait long for an understanding of how our minds interact
with our physical bodies. One can still say with Thompson
(1942, p. 13) that ‘Consciousness is not explained to my
comprehension by all the nerve-paths and neurons of the
physiologist.’ We are still faced with Weyl’s (1949, p. 215)
riddle of the ‘double position of the ego: it is not merely an
existing individual which carries out real psychic acts but
also ‘vision,’ a self-penetrating light (sense-giving conscious-
ness, knowledge, image, or however you may call it).’ Like
Monod (1970, pp. 198–199), Lorenz (1977, p. 169) remarks
on the barrier, ‘utterly impenetrable to the human under-
standing, that runs through the middle of what is the
undeniable one-ness of our personality — the barrier that
divides our subjective experience from the objective, verifi-
able physiological events that occur in our body.’ Lorenz
(1977, p. 170) considers this barrier unbridgeable, at least
with the cognitive apparatus at our disposal and probably
unbridgeable in principle. McGinn (1999, p. 51) comments
on the subjective ‘introspection-based view of conscious-
ness’ and the objective ‘perception-based view of the brain,
staring at each other across a yawning conceptual divide.’
Indeed, there is disagreement on how to define con-
sciousness. Nagel (1974, p. 436) thinks of consciousness
as (remembered?) ‘conscious experience’; Lorenz (1977,
pp. 169–170) thinks of it as our ‘subjective experience,’
our ‘feelings’; McGinn (1999, pp. 2–3) considers it ‘the
having of sensations, emotions, feelings, thoughts.’ McGinn
(1999) does not consider consciousness the same as self-
awareness. Monod (1970, pp. 198–199) on the other
hand, thinks of our consciousness as the ability to simulate
in our minds hypothetical actions or events and their
consequences — in other words, our ability to imagine.
Monod’s definition will not help us understand whether
consciousness has a material basis, but it does enable us to
learn that consciousness, whether material or not, is not
restricted to human beings: many animals have it, and
depend on it to live their lives. ‘Dreams are just another
form of consciousness’ (McGinn 1999, p. 2). Darwin (1871,
p. 46) quotes a phrase, ‘dream is an involuntary art of
poetry’ and remarks that ‘As dogs, cats, and probably all thehigher animals. . . have vivid dreams [as] is shown by their
movements and voice, we must admit that they possess
some form of imagination.’ The many animals that dream
must have consciousness. As for the uses of consciousness,
Lorenz (1977, p. 128) tells of an orangutan placed in a
room with a box in one corner and a banana too high to
reach in the opposite corner. He sat frustrated until he
looked from the box to the floor under the banana and
then to the banana itself. Then, as if he had just simulated
in his mind moving the box under the banana and climbing
the box to get it, he suddenly, delightedly, moved the box
and got the banana. Even the way humans use conscious-
ness reveals some analogy with our fellow animals. Weyl
(1949, p. 283) remarks that his inner subjective self-
awareness is the basis for his understanding of other people,
and ‘its illuminating light. . . also reaches, though with ever
increasing dimness and incertitude, deeply into the animal
kingdom.’ That is why animal behaviorists understand their
study animals better if they strive to see the world through
their animals’ eyes. Weyl’s remark also explains why animal
behaviorists so want to learn the extent to which their study
animals try to infer what their fellow group members
desire, intend or know (Cheney & Seyfarth 2007).
In sum, whether consciousness and certain aspects of in-
tellect have a partly immaterial basis is unknown, and may
be unknowable (McGinn 1999). It is, however, becoming
ever clearer that the material brain plays an essential role in
every mental function. So I agree with Changeux and
Ricoeur (1998) that it is legitimate to assume that with the
phenomena of the brain no influence alien to physics and
chemistry interferes. Such research has already amplified
our understanding of our brains’ relationship to other parts
of our bodies, and it has had striking medical implications
(Damasio 1994).
Barr’s primary problem here is his dogmatic denial of
consciousness, thought, foresight and the rudiments of
morality to other animals. I do not understand why any
Christian would want to declare such limits on God’s
generosity to His creatures: this is a heavy price to pay for
winning an argument. Moreover, the denial of conscious-
ness and foresight to cats, dogs, rats, even primates, and
the concomitant assumption that they cannot feel pain as
we do, has been used to justify inflicting cruel pain on
animals (Midgley 1983; Griffin 2001, pp. 253–269). In fact,
denying all animals these capacities — such a contrast with
Darwin’s extraordinary sympathy for animals — makes us
less insightful, less sympathetic lords of Creation. Our lord-
ship of creation is an inescapable fact, whatever our religion
or lack of it. This lordship imposes duties that we must not
shirk. Barr’s Part V is an example of how uncritical adher-
ence to arbitrary religious teachings leads not only to bad
science but behavior that discredits belief in God. It is a sad
conclusion to an otherwise well-balanced, constructive
book.
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